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In this paper I interpret the mechanical philosophy, not as an attempt to replace one, Aristotelian, 
account of the ultimate structure of the material world by another, mechanical, one but rather as an 
attempt to extend knowledge of such things as levers and clockworks that were archetypical 
mechanisms in the common sense of the term. At the dawn of the scientific revolution knowledge of 
that kind had been securely established and mathematically theorized in the area of statics, yielding a 
unified theory of such mechanisms as balances, levers and pulleys. The question I address is the extent 
to which extension of mechanical knowledge was capable of yielding in the seventeenth century the 
kind of novelty that might warrant the term ‘revolution’. More specifically, I focus on the extension of 
statics to include hydrostatics via the introduction of the concept of pressure. 
 
 The fact that the issue calls for some finely-tuned historical and philosophical analysis is bought out by 
highlighting puzzling features of the relationship between two early versions of hydrostatics, The 
Elements of Hydrostatic’s published by Simon Stevin in 1586 and the treatise On the Equilibrium of 
Liquids composed by Blaise Pascal around 1653 and published posthumously in 1664. The former reads 
as a text modeled on Euclidean geometry. Theorems are derived from postulates with the aid of many 
geometrical diagrams. Applications of the theory to novel situations are treated by Stevin not as 
providing evidence for, but as applications of, it. By contrast, Pascal explains a range of hydrostatic 
phenomena, both novel and already familiar, in a way that is justified by an appeal to experiment. There 
is no explicit appeal to mathematics and there are no geometrical diagrams. Pascal’s text would not be 
out of place in an introductory course on hydrostatics today. But the significance of these striking 
differences can be countered. All of the consequences of Pascal’s theory are in fact consequences of 
Stevin’s, or some modest extension of it. Many of the experiments appealed to by Pascal are modified 
versions of those described by Stevin (under the guise of practical applications). What is more, for all his 
emphasis on the experimental basis for his theory, there are reasons for doubting that Pascal actually 
performed the most significant of the experiments he describes! These latter points need to be dealt 
with if we are to read Pascal’s hydrostatics as a significant early move in the revolutionary 
transformation of science in the seventeenth century. 
 
 Anyone wishing to develop a theory of hydrostatics late in the sixteenth century could take a 
mathematical science of weight for granted. They could also take for granted a common-sense 
distinction between solids and liquids, including some puzzling phenomena such as the balancing of 
unequal volumes of liquid communicating via a common vessel. Solids and liquids are alike insofar as 
they possess weight. What was needed was a characterization of the distinguishing feature of liquids 
that differentiates them from solids and which could be added to weight to yield foundations for a 
science of hydrostatics. The fact that that move was far from obvious is apparent from the shortcomings 
of hydrostatics as formulated by such able thinkers as Galileo and Descartes. 
 
 Stevin’s hydrostatics can be challenged on the grounds that it appealed to questionable principles, such 
as his version of the impossibility of perpetual motion, and to arguments involving thought-experiments 
that lacked deductive rigor. But even if his derivations are conceded, there are some telling objections 
remaining. The additions to weight that need to be made to yield a hydrostatics were made by Stevin, 
not by way of an explicit and succinct characterization of the distinguishing feature of liquids, but by 
drawing on common sense knowledge of properties of liquids (such as the fact that they flow) in an 
opportunist and ad hoc way. Further, the reductio character of the arguments that he employed had the 
consequence that he failed to reveal the causality lying behind the phenomena described by his 
theorems, including novel phenomena described by Stevin as practical applications. If a mechanical 
explanation involves a grasp of the mechanism that links cause and effect, paradigmatically involved in 
the understanding of how clocks work, then Stevin did not supply a mechanical explanation of 
hydrostatic phenomena. (When Beeckman and Descartes evaluated Stevin’s hydrostatics in 1618 they 
explicitly raised the latter objection, with Beeckman complaining that Stevin ‘was too devoted to 
mathematics and dealt too rarely with physics’.) 
 
 In the first half of the seventeenth century figures such as Galileo and Descartes sought to identify 
fundamental principles on which to base their hydrostatics. These included the inverse proportionality 
principle, exhibited, for instance, by the movements about an equilibrium position of the weights on an 
unequalarmed balance, and the principle that a system moves spontaneously under gravity only if that 
motion involves a lowering of the centre of gravity of the system. These principles are restricted to the 
action of weights and the displacements involved are in a vertical direction only. For that reason 
attempts to extend application of the principles to the isotropic forces involved in hydrostatics were 
problematic and met with very partial success. 
 
 It is in Pascal’s Treatise that we find the above deficiencies overcome. Pascal makes it clear that by 
virtue of their ‘continuity and fluidity’ liquids transform forces applied to them, whether stemming from 
their own weight or applied externally, into isotropic ones that are transmitted throughout the liquid in 
such a way that the force per unit area is conserved. In short, Pascal introduced the notion of pressure 
as a cause of hydrostatic phenomena in addition to weight. The adequacy of the theory was to be borne 
out by experiments, a number of which were identified by Pascal. 
 
 But what are we to make of the fact that Pascal may not have bothered to carry out those experiments? 
Here I appeal to a notion of theory confirmation that was mentioned by Descartes and which I believe 
can be taken as representing views that were intuitively held at the time. According to that view a claim 
is confirmed to the extent that it can be successfully applied to a diverse range of cases in a natural, 
rather than contrived, way. On this view, it makes no difference whether or not knowledge of the cases 
precedes or postdates knowledge of the claim and it also makes degree of confirmation a matter of 
degree. Adopting this view, Pascal’s hydrostatics was significantly confirmed by virtue of the natural way 
that it could explain a wide range of phenomena, including puzzling phenomena, that had been known 
for many decades. That is why Pascal could be confident that the experiments he described would 
conform to his predictions. When Robert Boyle performed his own versions of Pascal’s experiments he 
did in effect extend the degree to which Pascal’s theory was confirmed, but in a way that would have 
come as no surprise to Pascal. What is more, Boyle’s success shows that Pascal’s theory was supportable 
by experiment in just the way he claimed it was. 
 
